We study how firms' disclosure decisions are related to their existing financing and production policies. We develop a rational expectations model in which a firm trades off the benefits of more precise disclosure in reducing its cost of capital against the costs of more precise disclosure in potentially revealing confidential information to competitors. Using abnormal return variance and trading volume (Beaver 1968) as proxies for disclosure precision, we find correlations consistent with our model.
Introduction
"A primary means of accomplishing these goals 1 is the disclosure of important financial information. Investors who purchase securities and suffer losses have important recovery rights if they can prove that there was incomplete or inaccurate disclosure of important information." -U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
The financial economics and accounting literature has long recognized that timely and accurate disclosure of financial information to investors is of utmost importance for public companies and proper functioning of the capital markets in general Akerlof (1970) . Disclosing firms have interests in the capital market to reduce the information asymmetry between themselves and their investors, but simultaneously have product market concerns because of the danger of leaking confidential business information to competitors. Yet surprisingly, to our best knowledge, no theoretical models to date explicitly incorporate these two factors.
In this paper, we develop a noisy rational expectations model in which the optimal disclosure precision arises endogenously as a result of firms trading off the marginal benefits from the capital market considerations and the marginal costs from the product market concerns. In the context of our model, the benefits of precise disclosure (i.e., capital market) depend on several factors such as the investors risk aversion and the proportion of informed investors. On the contrary, the costs are associated with factors such as the number of firms in the industry, which is a proxy for firms competitive pressure.
To test our model's empirical predictions, we proceed in two steps. First, we examine the empirical correlation between parameters in our model (e.g., risk aversion) and proxies for disclosure precision using a pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) specification. We find that consistent with the model's prediction, firms' disclosure precision increases with 1 The goals of the Securities Act of 1933: require that investors receive financial and other significant information concerning securities being offered for public sale; and prohibit deceit, misrepresentations, and other fraud in the sale of securities.
parameters, such as expected asset supply, but decreases with investors risk tolerance and number of competing firms in the industry, among others. When we condition firms on their lagged size and financial needs, 2 we find that firms which are a priori more plagued with information asymmetry problems and thus likely to find disclosure advantageous exhibit larger coefficient estimates on underlying parameters. Specifically, firms in the smallest (largest financial needs) quantile have more highly significant estimates than those in the largest (smallest financial needs) quantile.
Our second set of empirical results aims to investigate how firms' disclosure precision varies in response to exogenous variations to some of our model's key parameters. We examine firms' disclosure precision around three quasi-experiments, each of which stimulates an exogenous change to an underlying parameter in our model. We employ the merger of brokerage firms as an unexpected variation to informed investors' holdings, large reductions in import tariffs as a sudden increase in number of competitors in the industry, and the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack as an unanticipated shock to investors' risk aversion. In each case, we find results consistent with our model's predictions.
Our study of firms' information disclosure is related to a large literature in financial economics and accounting that examines firms' information environment. A fundamental reason for firms to disclose information is that they face an incentive to reduce the information asymmetry between themselves and their investors, since information asymmetry has significant impact on firms' cost of capital. 3 A series of early papers characterize the condition under which firms engage in full disclosure (e.g., Grossman and Hart 1980 , Grossman 1981 , and Milgrom 1981 . Subsequent studies recognize that proprietary costs of disclosure that prevent full disclosure must exist. For example, Arya, Frimor, and Mittendorf (2010) present a model of endogenous disclosure costs in which partial disclosure is sustained in 2 The rationale for using them is that smaller firms and firms with higher financial needs presumably have a larger incentive to disclose precise information. Hence we expect higher magnitudes in coefficient estimates as well as statistical significance in smaller firms and in firms with higher financial needs. 3 For theoretical models using noisy rational expectation framework, see Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) , Wang (1993) , Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O'Hara (2002) , and Lambert, Leuz, and Verrecchia (2011) equilibrium because disclosing value-increasing information for one business segment comes at the cost of implying value-decreasing information for another business segment.
By investigating firms incentives in the product market, our model is also closely related to the literature studying the interaction of product market competition, informed trading and asset pricing. 4 For example, Tookes (2007) presents a model of informed trading in which asset values are derived from imperfectly competitive product market and private information events occur at individual firms. Peress (2010) studies the relationship among product market competition, insider trading, and stock market efficiency.
Our study distinguishes from the existing literature along several important dimensions.
First, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to simultaneously examine the incentives from the capital market and the potential costs associated with disclosure in the product market. Second, in contrast to papers such as Tookes (2007) and Peress (2010) , this paper jointly allows for information flow between the capital market and the product market. Third, we exploit several exogenous quasi-experiments which introduce shocks to underlying parameters in the model to allow for a tighter test of the model's predictions.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the model and its empirical implications. We discuss the data and empirical specifications in Section 3, present the empirical findings in Section 4, and offer concluding remarks in Section 5.
4 Gaspar and Massa (2006) and Irvine and Pontiff (2009) document that sales volatility in product market contributes to idiosyncratic volatility of returns. Hou and Robinson (2006) show that industry concentration can serve as a priced characteristic. Hoberg and Phillips (2010b) examine the business cycle feature of relationship among product market competition, firms cash flows and stock returns. We consider a firm that has assets in place with unobservable fundamental value ofṼ per share, but the issuance price is only P where E(P ) < E(Ṽ ) due to information asymmetry (Myers and Majluf, 1984) . The firm also has M amount of cash holdings. To finance its production plan, the firm has decided to issue X shares of assets in place, which is jointly used with the internal liquidity M . For simplicity, we also assume that the firm's products in an oligopoly market with linear demand and that firms engage in quantity (Cournot)
competition. The firm's production generates π in profit and has fixed costs of c. The goal of the firm is to maximize its overall value:
The budget constraint simply states that the sum of the proceeds from selling assets in place XP and internal liquidity M must be greater than or equal to the sunk cost c. We make several assumptions: First, while we recognize that the firm makes several decisions including the amount of cash to retain, how much equity to issue, etc., we focus on the information disclosure decision as the only decision variable in our model. The implication is that while variables X,M , and c are endogenous in reality, we treat them as orthogonal to the firm's information disclosure problem in its reduced form. Second, we make the assumption that information flow is free between the two markets so that investors and rival firms extract the same level of precision η from those two separate signals. That is, a signal is interpreted in the same way in the capital market and the product market. In our model, the information disclosure precision η will mainly affect asset price P (per share) and production profit π, a higher precision η will reduce the information wedge between the firm and investors thus increase P , but will simultaneously reduce the firms informational advantage over its rivals and lead to a lower π. Therefore, we rewrite the firm's reduced problem as:
where
) is some threshold level of information disclosure to ensure that financing the production is both profitable and feasible from the firm's perspective. 5 In the next subsection, we discuss how information problems in the capital market and the product market affect the two terms E[(P (η) −Ṽ )X] and E[π(η) − c] separately.
Financing in the Capital Market: The Benefit of Disclosure
The firm sells its assets in place with intrinsic value isṼ at a price P per share, which is endogenously determined in the capital market equilibrium. Note that the price of the security P fully captures the expected production proceeds. 6 For simplicity, we assume that the security represents a claim to the extant assets in place.
The information asymmetry stems from the unobservability of the intrinsic valueṼ .
While the firm knows the exact value ofṼ , investors only know its prior distribution N (m, Φ −1 ). To reduce the informational wedge in order to bring its price P closer to the intrinsic valueṼ , the firm can send a noisy public signalỹ =Ṽ +ẽ whereẽ is orthogonal toṼ and has a distribution N (0, η −1 ). We term η the "information precision" of the public signal y. To prevent the "no-trade" equilibrium (i.e., Milgrom and Stokey, 1982) , we introduce a second source of randomness: noisy trading , as in other rational noisy expectation models, 5 Asset price is a function of information precision P (η), so P −1 (.) is an inverse function and will be 0 if the argument is less than or equal to 0. 6 The security could also include a claim to the net production proceeds E[π(η) − c]; however, since for any given information precision level η, investors don't value the production proceeds differently from the firm. In addition, to induce a higher order interaction term, investors in the capital market must disagree with the firm about the ex-ante expected net proceeds from production, and this disagreement must arise from the asymmetric information problem between investors and the firm to affect equilibrium information disclosure.
which we model as random supply. Specifically, we assume that the asset supply X has a distribution N (X, W −1 ) which is independent of any other randomness. It is important to note that this randomness does not contribute to the asymmetric information problem, since neither the firm or investors has perfect foresight. That is, while the firm wants to issue X in expectation, the noise trading makes the realized issuance X fluctuate around X.
There also exists a unit mass of investors in the economy with CARA utility with absolute risk aversion coefficient 1/τ (so that τ is the risk tolerance). Given a particular asset price P in equilibrium and an exogenous initial wealth W i 0 , investor i decides how much of security X i to hold conditional on the specific information F i observable to her.
For completeness, we assume that there are (1 − β) proportion of uninformed investors who can observe only the public signalỹ and asset price P , 7 while the remaining β proportion are informed investors who can observe in addition an idiosyncratic private signalz. For simplicity, we assume that each informed investor i interpret the private signalz asz(i) = V +ξ(i), withξ(i) ∼ N (0, ψ −1 ) which is independent across informed investors but is of the same precision. The firm incurs a fixed production cost c and competes with other firms in an economy with asymmetric information. The net profit of the production process is E(π − c). For simplicity, we assume that the firm issuing securities in the capital market has an informa-7 Asset price P will also be a channel to convey information; see the proof in Appendix for details. 8 It might be useful to model informed investors since earnings announcement surprise is used as a measure of informed trading in Peress (2010), but we want to use it as a measure of firms active information disclosure, so we first need to distinguish the effect of informed trading.
tional advantage about the product market demand. 9 . One crucial assumption in our model is that there be perfect 10 information leakage at no cost from the capital market to the product market. That is, the public signalỹ sent in the capital market will be reinterpreted by product market rivals as a signalγ with the same amount of informativeness. Intuitively, one can think of this assumption as suggesting that rivals in the product market dedicate an equal amount of attention to their rivals' actions and possess equal ability as capital market investors in interpreting the signals sent by their rivals. Hence, any public signal (ỹ) sent in the capital market will be inferred by product market competitors without informational loss about the superior information, as if the rivals received a twin signalγ with the same precision in the first place. The only way the firm can prevent valuable information from being disclosed to competitors is through controlling the information precision η in the capital market.
Firms engage in Cournot competition. Any individual firm i competes with the other N − 1 firms by setting quantity produced. Marginal costs of production are assumed to be zero, and products are perfect substitutes. 11 The inverse demand takes a linear form P g =α − wQ, and the profit of the firm j is π j = (α − wQ)q j .
The parameterα reflects the information advantage of firm 1: While firm 1 knowsα, but the remaining N −1 firms viewα with a lognormal prior logα ∼ N (log α− 1 2 S −1 , S −1 ) where E(α) =α, and V ar(logα = S −1 ). Note that as long asỹ is released in the capital market, firm 1 cannot prevent the twin signalγ from being leaked to its product market rivals. In particular, the signal takes the formγ =αφ (or equivalently logγ = logα + logφ. The twin signalγ partially revealsα, with the information precision level η affecting the variance of orthogonal noise logφ ∼ N (− The capital market equilibrium consists of asset price P, informed investors trading X I , and uninformed investors trading X U , such that: (1) informed investor i solves the utility maximization problem with respect to his information set
uninformed investor solves the utility maximization problem with respect to a coarser information set F i = σ {P,ỹ}, (3) asset market clears βX I + (1 − β)X U =X, and (4) price is self-fulfilling P = E[P |ỹ, P ]. The following proposition describes the equilibrium price and quantities.
PROPOSITION 1: The asset price and allocations for informed and uninformed investors are characterized as follows.
• Share price is
• Allocations for informed and uninformed investors are
Proof: See Appendix.
Note that the price is a linear combination of unbiased prior expectation of asset value m, the unbiased noisy public informationỹ, the expected asset supply X, noise tradings X − X, and the true unobserved asset valueṼ . Therefore, the price itself is stochastic but perfectly anticipated by investors. What the firm would care about more, however, is the wedge between ex-ante expected asset price and asset value which defines the cost of capital.
B. Cost of Capital and Benefit of Information Disclosure
The cost of capital is defined as E[(Ṽ − P )X], and in equilibrium it equals
Note that higher information precision η decreases cost of capital. Thus, we can define the benefit of information disclosure as
Intuitively, the benefit of information disclosure is the reduction in cost of capital if a signal is released with precision η compared with the default case in which no signal is released. 13 The following proposition formalizes the marginal benefit of information disclosure.
PROPOSITION 2:
The marginal benefit of information disclosure and comparative statics are given as follows:
13 It is equivalent to releasing a signal with zero precision, or the variance of orthogonal noise is infinite.
• The marginal benefit of information disclosure is decreasing
• The marginal benefit of information disclosure is decreasing in absolute risk tolerance τ , precision of private information ψ, proportion of informed investors β, precision of noise tradings W , precision of prior public information Φ, and increasing in expected asset supply X.
Proof: Taking derivatives of M B with respect to τ , ψ, β, W , Φ, X gives the results.
The Product Market

A. Product Market Equilibrium
The product market equilibrium consists of goods price P G , firm 1 production quantity q 1 , firm 2 to N production quantities q ≡ q j , 2 ≤ j ≤ N , such that (1) firm 1 sets production quantity q 1 as a best response to all other firms' quantities, (2) firm j (2 ≤ j ≤ N ) sets production quantity q j as a best response to a rational expectation of all other firms' quantities with respect to an information set spanned by signal γ, 14 and (3) equilibrium goods price is determined by P G = α − wQ where Q = N j=1 q j . The following proposition describes the equilibrium price and quantities.
PROPOSITION 3: The goods price and allocations for firm 1 and its rivals are characterized as follows:
• Goods price is
• Quantities produced by firm 1 and its rivals are
B. Costs of Information Disclosure
We define the cost of information disclosure as
where π 1 (0) is the sales profit when η = 0, and this cost is positive in general. The following proposition gives the expressions for gross and marginal cost of information disclosure in equilibrium.
PROPOSITION 4:
The gross and marginal cost of information disclosure and relevant comparative statics are given as follows:
• The gross cost of information disclosure is proportional to V ar(E[α|η]).
• The marginal cost of information disclosure is increasing in normal case when η + S < .
.
• The marginal cost of information is increasing in number of rivals N and the mean of the intercept of linear demand α; it is decreasing in the prior precision of the intercept of linear demand S and the negative slope of linear demand ω.
There are two possible cases: Case 1:α is unobservable, η + S < 1 2 , 15 so one additional information disclosure ∆η will incur more marginal cost. 16 Case 2:γ is a linear inα in which case marginal cost would be decreasing η (i.e. MC (η) < 0). In this case we still
In either case, the comparative statics take similar signs and the intuitions are straightforward.
In our model, competition is simply characterized by the number of firms N , so a higher N is associated with more intense competition in the product market and releasing additional information leads to higher costs. In addition, both higher α and lower w imply a larger ex-ante expected profit if no information is released. As a result, the opportunity cost of one more unit of information disclosure is increasing in α and 1/w. Finally, since additional information disclosure and extant information in the economy are substitutes for one another, higher prior information precision (larger S) mitigates the effect of ∆η (i.e., marginal cost decreasing in S).
Firm's Optimal Information Disclosure
Now we are able to characterize the firm's optimal disclosure policy after the asset price P and sales proceeds π are determined in capital market and product market equilibria.
Specifically,
15 η+S is the ex-post logα precision, this condition is satisfied if and only if V ar [log(α)] > 2 or Std [log(α)] > √ 2 ≈ 1.41. Note that when Std [log(α)] < 1.96 it means thatα is discernible at a p-value of 0.05 and thus almost observable, so the unobservability condition implies that Std [log(α)] > 1.96 and further η +S < 1 2 . Therefore, this is truly a normal case in which logα is the underlying unobservable that generates the asymmetric information. 16 The reason for this is that the effect of ∆η goes to the exponential term by construction.
The second order condition if η 0 ≥ η is given by
Note that the second order condition is always satisfied whenever the firm takes an active strategy to disclose additional information (i.e., η 0 ≥ η) under the normal case.
Hence, the optimal information disclosure level η * is determined by equalizing marginal benefit and marginal cost. 
Discussion of Modeling Assumptions
In this section, we discuss the key modeling assumptions we make in this paper, as well as the potential limitations and robustness of our model.
First, we assume that the firm's only decision to make is the disclosure of information.
That is, all the other important decisions such as cash retention, production decisions, and number of equities to issue are determined before the information disclosure decision. We believe this is a reasonable assumption: in comparison to soft decisions, hard decisions such as cash retention often involve more irrevocable costs and have larger and longer-lasting impacts.
Second, we assume that there is perfect informational leakage between capital market and product market at no cost so that the public signal sent in the capital market will be reinterpreted as a signal with the same amount of informativeness by product market rivals and vice versa. In the Appendix (A.3), we consider under what circumstances our assumptions are likely to hold or to be violated.
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Overall, while we recognize the potential limitations of our model, we believe it provides useful testable empirical predictions on firms' disclosure behavior, which we directly investigate in the following empirical test. Table 2 presents the summary statistics for the key variables used in our empirical examination. There seems to be considerable variation in some of the variables. For example, the abnormal return variance has a mean of 0.011, a median of 0.001, and a maximum value of 1.275. This suggests that the distribution of the variable is heavily skewed to the right.
In our empirical examinations, we winsorize all variables at the 1% level and find similar results. In addition, our sample seems to be comparable to previous studies that utilize quarterly financial data (e.g., Hoberg and Phillips (2010a) and Duchin, Ozbas, and Sensoy (2010) .
[Insert Table 2 ] 
Empirical Measures
We present the model parameters and their corresponding empirical proxies in Table   3 . We selectively discuss some of these measures. Note that the negative signs behind the empirical measures indicate that the empirical proxy is negatively correlated with their corresponding measure in the original model and thus the predictions from Table 1 would be reversed.
[Insert Table 3 ]
Disclosure Precision
This is our dependent variable in all regressions. To measure the precision (i.e., the informational content) of firms' disclosure, we use two empirical proxies suggested in Beaver 
Risk Tolerance
We use the investors' Sentiment Index from Baker and Wurgler (2006) to measure risk tolerance. To the extent the Sentiment Index reflects the aggregate underlying economic forces such as IPO volume, option implied volatilities (VIX), and mutual fund flows, it is a noisy proxy of investors' risk tolerance and biases our estimates downward.
Prior Public Information Precision
We measure prior information precision using the absolute difference between actual and estimated earnings one quarter prior to the announcement. This measure provides an estimate of the extent existing information has been absorbed by the market. Precision of the prior information should be negatively correlated with the distance between the estimates and the actuals. Thus the prior public information precision is measured by the (negative) log of one plus the absolute difference between actual and estimated earnings.
Proportion of Informed Investors and Private Information Precision
We use Thomson Reuters' institutional holdings and mutual fund holdings to measure informed investors. 
Expected Asset Supply and Precision of Asset Supply
We use turnover, defined as the log of the ratio of trading volume over shares outstanding, as a measure of asset supply. For precision of asset supply, we closely follow the model specification closely and take the standard deviation of turnover in the previous quarter up to the announcement date as a proxy for (the inverse of) precision of asset supply.
20 Note that X I − X U = τ ψ(z(i) − P ), which is monotonic in ψ; It is also consistent with the intuition. 21 We take the ratio of (absolute) change of shares held by mutual funds and managers divided by trading volume and then take the log of this number to make the distribution less skewed.
Control Variables
Firm-specific control variables included in almost all regression specifications include firms' cash holdings, investment, leverage, book-to-market ratio, firm size, and return on assets. While we recognize that many of these variables are endogenous in nature, they are included to better control for observable differences at the firm level.
Empirical Specification
In our empirical tests, we first use a pooled regression specification to examine the correlation between our model's various parameters and the disclosure precision. We include control variables and firm fixed effects to control for observable firm level characteristics and observable and unobservable time-invariant firm level factors, respectively.
In the second step of our empirical examination, we exploit several exogenous shocks to certain parameters of our model to investigate how firms disclosure policy varies accordingly.
For example, we exploit the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack in New York, which subsequently led to a dramatic decrease in investors risk tolerance. We employ the following difference-in-difference (DID hereafter) specification:
where i indexes firm and t indexes time. T reated it is a dummy variable that equals one post the treatment. 22 X it is a vector of control variables mentioned above, and ε it is the error term. The key coefficient of interest is β 1 , which captures the treatment effect of the different shocks on firms disclosure precision.
We employ three quasi-experiments in our empirical investigation, each affecting a 22 The definition for T reated it differs between the various shocks: for both tariff reduction and brokerage house mergers, T reated it equals one if a firm has been treated by t. For 9/11, however, there is no control group (i.e., everyone is treated), thus T reated it simply equals one, post 9/11 for all firms. In this regard, 9/11 resembles an event similar to the financial crisis between 2007-2009. In addition, the window of examination is different for each of these exogenous shocks, since many of them do not have permanent effects on the underlying model parameters different parameter of our model. The first of these is the merger of brokerage firms first introduced in Kacperczyk and Hong (2010) . These mergers result in an average of one analyst fired for reasons such as cultural clash or redundancy of coverage. To the extent that institutional ownership is positively correlated with analyst coverage (see Bhushan, 1989) , a reduction in the number of analysts likely leads to a reduction in institutional ownership. In our model, this represents a decline in the proportion of informed investors, which in our hypothesis will lead to an increase in the disclosure precision.
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The second quasi-experiment is the reductions in import tariffs of large magnitudes.
Many prior studies, such as Fresard (2010), Fresard and Valta (2016) , and Xu (2012), have used such variations in import tariffs as an exogenous variation in domestic firms competitive environment. We interpret this variation as an instrument that likely leads to more (foreign) firms (i.e., a larger N) entering the domestic market. Since the marginal cost of disclosure increases with more competitors, we expect an increase in the number of firms in the industry to lower the disclosure precision.
The final shock we employ in this paper is the terrorist attack on New York's twin towers on September 11, 2001 (9/11 hereafter) in the United States. Numerous press articles 24 and academic papers 25 document that investors' risk aversion (tolerance) significantly increases (decreases) after 9/11. We exploit this aversion as an exogenous shock to investors' sentiment and examine firms' disclosure behavior around this event. Specifically, we expect that as the risk tolerance decreases post 9/11, firms' disclosure precision increases.
23 A decrease in the proportion of informed investors β increases the marginal benefit of disclosure and should increase the disclosure precision. 24 See http://money.msn.com/stock-broker-guided/how-9-11-changed-investing-market-watch 25 e.g., Wrolstad and Krueger (2003) and Karolyi and Martell (2006) We now turn to our first set of results, which examine the correlation between firms' disclosure precision and various parameters in the model. Table 4 presents the main results.
The dependent variable is the abnormal return variance during the [0,1] window around quarterly announcements. In Column 1, we regress the abnormal return variance on the determinants of optimal disclosure as specified in our model. We find that consistent with our model's predictions, the abnormal return variance is positively correlated with turnover and the standard deviation of turnover, and varies negatively with the percentage of informed investors holdings and trading, sentiment, and number of firms in the industry. The results are robust to adding control variables in Column 2 and firm fixed effects in Column 3.
Columns 4 to 6 contain the same set of regression estimates except we employ the Hoberg and Phillips (2010a) text-based fixed industry classification to replace the NAICS system.
Overall the results remain unaffected by this alternative industry definition.
[Insert Table 4] In Table 5 , we aim to provide further empirical validity by conditioning on firms' past size and financial needs. We sort firms based on their lagged size (logarithm of total assets) and financial needs (difference between capital expenditure and cash holdings) into six quantiles ([0,25] , [25, 50] , [50, 75] , [75, 90] , [90, 95] , [95, 99] ) and reestimate the regression in Table 4 for each group. Since smaller firms and firms with larger financial gaps are plagued with more severe information asymmetry problems, disclosure is likely a more important decision for them. Therefore, we hypothesize that the parameter estimates increase monotonically from the largest (smallest) to smallest (largest) size (financial needs) quantile. In Panel A, we find that although not all coefficient estimates increase monotonically as our model predicts, coefficient estimates in Column 6 are much larger in magnitude than in Column 1 for variables such as turnover, percentage of informed investors' holding, sentiment, and number of firms in the industry. We emphasize these variables since they also constitute the core of the second step of our empirical examination. Panel B contains the results for various size quantiles and the results are similar. In particular, the magnitude of coefficient estimates in Table 1 is much larger than in Column 6 (largest size quantile), suggesting that disclosure is much more important for small firms than their larger counterparts.
[Insert Table 5] In Table 6 , we estimate how changes in firm disclosure precision after the mergers of brokerage houses results in firing of analysts. Employing a DID specification as in Eq. Table 6 support the conjecture that the percentage of informed investors holding is an important determinant of firms disclosure policy.
[Insert Table 6 ] Table 7 contains the results when we "shock" the number of firms in the industry. We examine how firms' disclosure policy changes subsequent to large reductions in import tariffs, which we interpret as an unexpected increase in the number of competitors in the industry.
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Consistent with our hypothesis that a larger number of firms increases the marginal cost of 26 We interpret this generally in the sense that foreign firms do not necessarily have to build establishments in the U.S. To the extent that ex-post imports are likely to increase in the U.S., it is as if more firms are competing with the domestic firms. Similar to Table 6 , we employ an alternative window in Columns 3 and 4 and the main results continue to hold. In Panel B, we consider different definitions of tariff cuts. Specifically, we consider cases when the annual decrease in import tariff in a particular industry is two, three, or four times larger than its historical mean. We make two observations: First, relative to the control group, the treated firms experience a significant, lower abnormal return variance post tariff reduction shock across all three thresholds. Second, the effect is stronger when the magnitude of reduction is larger, which provides additional support to our model.
[Insert Table 7] Finally, we investigate how firms' disclosure decision varies in response to the 9/11 terrorist attack. To the extent that investors' confidence deteriorates and their risk aversion increases, we expect firms' disclosure precision to increase post 9/11. Since investors risk tolerance is likely to be correlated with macroeconomic conditions such as business cycles and thus exhibits mean reversion, we restrict the window of investigation to two quarters after 9/11. Table 8 displays the results. As Column 1 shows, firms significantly increase their disclosure precision post 9/11. When we add control variables in Column 2, the coefficient estimate on Post 9/11 Dummy indeed increases from 0.0022 to 0.0034. Columns 3 and 4 estimate the same regressions for the [0,3] window and find similar results.
[Insert Table 8] We conduct a number of robustness checks. 27 First, we reestimate all regressions using the abnormal trading volume as an alternative measure of disclosure informativeness; our results are unchanged. Second, we re-run all regressions using the Hoberg and Phillips (2010a) 27 Results are unreported for space consideration.
industry definition and find our results unaffected. Third, we experiment with clustering our standard errors at different levels (industry, industry-quarter, etc.) and adding industry fixed effects; our results are robust to such alternative specifications. Finally, in all DID specifications, we allow for all our covariates to interact with year and find similar results.
Conclusion
In this paper, we bring together firms' incentives to disclose information in the capital market and proprietary costs in disclosing information in the product market, factors examined separately in the existing literature. By building a noisy rational expectation model, we characterize firms' optimal disclosure policy where they explicitly equalize the marginal benefit of information disclosure in reducing the cost of capital and the marginal cost of information disclosure in increasing competition in product market.
We conduct a variety of empirical tests to examine the empirical validity of our model. 
A.1 Proofs
(1) Proof of Proposition 1
The information set for each type of investors is not the same, so the expectation is taken on different information sets, denote it by F i which could be U (uninformed) or I (informed), then investors solve their own optimization problem, we get that
After imposing market clearing (similarly denote informed by
I and uninformed by U).
Then we obtain
Note that price P needs to be self-fulfilling such that P = E[P |ỹ, P ], so let's write the two types of information sets more explicitly I(i) = σ(P,ỹ,z(i)) and U = σ(P,ỹ) wherez(i) has the same noise-to-signal ratio.
Guess that P takes the following form that P = a + bṼ + cỹ − dX + eX with coefficients to be determined. Denote the orthogonal information in price byũ then we have that
andũ can be thought as a signal of the fundamental value with noise ς.ũ
So the conditional variance ofũ givenṼ (denoted by 1 θ or θ is the precision) is
Finally, by applying the Bayesian updating rule we have that
where π i = Φ + η + ψ + θ for informed investor and π i = Φ + η + θ for uninformed investor, also S i = ψ for informed investor and S i = 0 for uninformed investor. Plugging E[Ṽ |I] and E[Ṽ |U] into the above market clearing equation, we have that
Since the idiosyncratic partξ(i) of the private informationz(i) is independent, by Law or Large Number Jz (i). After some calculations, we will get
and thus θ = (βψτ ) 2 W . Plugging into the expression of P we have that
and plugging into the allocation will give the expressions of X i in Proposition 1 after some calculation.
(2) Proofs of Proposition 3 and 4
After working out the first order condition we will get that
The market clearing condition is Q = N j=1 q j . Plug q i into the second equation and using the symmetry among firms 2 to N we'll get the expression of P G , Q, and q j , 1 <= j <= N in Proposition 3. Furthermore, we have that
After some algebra, we will get that
Note that we can apply the similar formula to the case without any information disclosure (where η = 0), then E[π 1 (0)] takes the same form except that E(V ar[α|γ) is now replaced by V ar(α), so the cost of information disclosure is simply
. Finally, using the Bayesian updating rule and after some calculation (please calculate E(logα| logγ) and V ar(logα| logγ) first), we will get:
After plugging V ar(E[α|γ])
we get the expressions for C(η) and MC(η) in the Proposition 3 and 4, and the third derivative is
(3) Proof of Joint Comparative Statics
Let x denote any factor in the capital market and y any factor in the product market, then by the first order condition of the firms optimization problem, we have that
Taking derivatives with respect to x and y gives us
Note that under normal condition when η + S < 1/2 we have an upward sloping marginal cost curve and we always have a downward sloping marginal benefit curve, so the secondorder condition satisfies such that
< 0 at η = η * , therefore, η * (x) takes the same sign as ∂MB/∂x and η * (y) takes the same sign as ∂MC/∂y.
A.2 Data Filtering (1) Firm Fundamentals and Returns
Stock return data is from CRSP monthly stock file at WRDS, with common stocks (share code 10 and 11) listed in NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ (exchange code 1, 2, and 3). Data with missing price is dropped. Firm's accounting data is from Compustat annual industrial file at WRDS with a consolidation level equals "C", industry format equal "INDL", data format "STD", population source "D", currency "USD", and company status "Active", and further SIC codes not between 4900 and 4949 or 6000 and 6999 (excluding utilities and financial firms). Data with missing asset, liabilities, common equities, or cash holdings is dropped. Data with both return information in CRSP and fundamental information in Compustat is kept, the linktype must be among "LC", "LU", "LX", "LD", "LS", "LN", and the link between CRSP and Compustat must has been used by WRDS.
(
2) Earnings and Sales Forecast
Earnings and sales forecast is from I/B/E/S summary history at WRDS. We keep data of U.S. firms with measure equal to "EPS" and "SAL", forecast period equal to six months and with no missing data for actual earnings. Then we take the mean of earnings forecast for each pair of announcement date and forecast period ending date, and combine with fundamentals and returns data. Data with missing GVKEY or PERMNO is dropped. The final merged dataset is at a quarterly frequency.
A.3 Cross Dependence in Signals
We discuss the case where we allow for the interdependence between the marginal cost (benefit) of disclosure in the product market (capital market) and signals from the other market.
Recall that the overall problem firms' face is:
Benefit of information disclosure:
Cost of information disclosure:
We can restate the Overall problem on Page 8 as:
Recall η is the information disclosure level in the capital market, as well as the information disclosure level in the product market. What we assume in the model (see page 14) is that "there is perfect informational leakage from capital market to product market at no cost so that the public signalỹ sent in the capital market will be reinterpreted as a signalγ with the same amount of informativeness by product market rivals and vice versa. So effectively, if we use another notation, δ, for the disclosure level in the product market, the Overall problem above could be restated as:
More explicitly, the benefit of information disclosure in the capital market B(η, δ) depends on the disclosure level in the capital market η, as well as the disclosure level in the product market δ, and while there is a perfect information exchange, δ = η. Let's see δ as a function of η so that δ(η) = η and plug this function into our objective, the FOC for the Overall problem becomes:
Recall that we have defined MB(η) = ∂B(η,δ) ∂η
is the marginal reduction in cost of capital due to an orthogonal signal from the product market, and
is the marginal reduction in firm profit due to an orthogonal signal from the capital market. So the true FOC, assuming an interior solution and after imposing the restriction η = δ, would be:
And the FOC of what we will solve in the paper by considering the two markets separately is:
Comparing the two FOCs, the difference is
| η=δ . Now we want to examine when our assumption is valid so that the difference is negligible. This happens when these two numbers are small, i.e., the marginal effect on benefit or cost in one market due to the disclosure in the other market is small.
is the change of benefit of information disclosure in capital market if there is a signal in the product market ∆δ, but there is no information leakage so the information in asset market does not change. The only possibility that δ could affect B is that δ affects the earnings or profits of the firm, and the firm in turn needs to issue more equity. However, in the beginning, we assume the firm already made the hard decision first, i.e., determining the amount of equity issuance, therefore,
∂B(η,δ) ∂δ
≈ 0 for all δ given this assumption.
• ∂C(η,δ) ∂η is the change of cost of information disclosure in the product market if there is a signal in the capital market ∆η, given fixed δ. Again, if no more (less) information is disclosed in the product market, things affecting the profit through the capital market disclosure is the decision of financing and production. However, the firm has fixed the scale of production, so η could hardly affect C through a non-informational channel.
• The assumptions that the hard decisions are made first (# of equity to issue, # of products to produce) and the soft decisions are made second (amount of information to disclose) are also reasonable because the hard decisions involve more irrevocable costs and have impacts over more periods of time. Therefore, in an ideal forwardlooking world, the information disclosure decision should depend on the parameters of the already-made hard decisions, which correspond to the various determinants in our This table presents lists the parameters that are determinants of the optimal disclosure η * . Expected asset supply is proxied by turnover.
Private information precision is proxied by proportion of informed investors' trading. Proportion of informed investors is proxied by the proportion of informed investors' holdings.
Precision of asset supply is proxied by the standard deviation of turnover.
Prior public information precision is proxied by the absolute value of the earnings surprise in the previous quarter.
Risk tolerance is proxied by the investor sentiment index as in Baker and Wurgler (2006) .
All model parameters and empirical proxies are listed in Table 3 . This table presents the summary statistics on the key variables used in the empirical investigation. The sample period is from 1993q1 to 2010q4, consisting of 3,807 different U.S. firms with 89,560 firm-quarter observations. Abnormal return variance is calculated as the average squares of the predicted errors from the market model during the firms' earnings announcement window [0, 1] with day 0 being the earnings announcement date reported in I/B/E/S, scaled by the variance of residual returns from the firms' market model estimated over the 100 trading day [-120, -21] window. The abnormal trading volume is the average trading volume during the firms earnings announcement window [0, 1] with day 0 being the earnings announcement date reported in I/B/E/S, scaled by the average trading volume over the 100 trading day [-120, -21] window. Earnings announcement surprise is the sum of absolute abnormal return over a [-1,+1] window around announcement date, with the hypothetical return without announcement estimated using [-250,-10] estimation period with daily returns and risk factors information using Carhart four factor model. Turnover is the log of the ratio of quarterly trading volume over shares outstanding. Standard deviation of turnover is the standard deviation of daily turnover (defined similarly) in the previous quarter up to the announcement date. Proportion of informed investors holdings is the ratio of shares held by mutual funds and managers divided by shares outstanding. Proportion of informed investors tradings is proxied by the logarithm of the ratio of (absolute) change of shares held by mutual funds and managers divided by trading volume. Difference between actual and estimated earnings is the logarithm of one plus the absolute difference between actual and estimated earnings. Number of firms is the number of firms in an industry where the industry is defined by NAICS first three digits or by Hoberg and Phillips 100-industry code. Sales is the industry-mean of logarithm of adjusted sales, where the industry defined as above and adjusted sales is sales divided by last-years total assets. Difference of estimated and actual sales is defined similarly as the difference of estimated and actual earnings by first taking the absolute difference of estimated and actual adjusted sales, then taking the industry-mean and plus one, and last take the logarithm of this number. HHI is the proportion of squared sales over the sum of squared sales in one industry. All measures at the industry-level take the same numbers for all firms in one industry and the industry is defined by both NAICS first three digits or by Hoberg and Phillips 100 industry-code. Cash holdings is cash and cash equivalents divided by last-years total assets. Capital investment is capital expenditure (CAPX) divided by last-years total assets. Leverage is long-term debt divided by total assets, book-to-market ratio is book equity to market equity, where market equity is the end-of-quarter stock price times shares outstanding. Book equity is constructed as stockholders equity (Compustat item 216, or 60+130, or 6-181, in that order) plus balance sheet deferred taxes and investment tax credit minus the book value of preferred stock (Compustat item 56, or 10, or 130, in that order). Size is logged total assets. ROA is earnings before interest divided by last-years total assets. Detailed data filtering procedure is documented in Appendix A. Table 2 . ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
N
[ Table 4 , with coefficients suppressed for space considerations. Industry is defined as at the 3-digit NAICS level. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 0, 3] with day 0 being the earnings announcement date reported in I/B/E/S, scaled by the variance of residual returns from the firms market model estimated over the 100 trading day [-120, -21] window. All other variables are defined in Table 2 . ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and allow for clustering at the merger level. Table 2 . ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and allow for double clustering by firm and quarter. 
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